2:36 am, Friday, 10 October 2025
BREAKING NEWS
Reviving the Rural Economy: $100 Million ADB–Bangladesh Agreement The Journey Begins for Cox’s Bazar’s First Plastic Recycling Plant Why the world’s biggest food company is stepping back Nestlé has withdrawn from a high-profile international alliance to cut methane from dairy supply chains, a move that instantly sharpened debate over how fast and by what methods the sector should decarbonize; the company says it will keep pursuing on-farm emissions cuts through its own programs while reassessing the group’s approach and governance, but the exit deprives the coalition of its most recognizable member and risks slowing peer benchmarking, shared pilot data, and pooled purchasing that can bring down costs for farmers. Methane from cattle is a potent, short-lived climate pollutant, and many governments have leaned on voluntary industry compacts to accelerate adoption of feed additives, manure management, and breeding strategies; critics of Nestlé’s decision warn that a fragmentation of efforts could reduce transparency and make it harder for buyers, lenders, and regulators to compare progress across brands, whereas supporters counter that company-led projects tied to local agronomy and subsidies often deliver faster, measurable gains than broad global charters. The policy backdrop is shifting as well: several markets are moving from pure carrots to a mix of incentives and performance-based conditions on grants and export supports, and that pivot raises stakes for how milk processors document emissions baselines and third-party verification, because the credibility of Scope 3 targets rests on comparable methodologies rather than marketing claims alone. Practically, much of the abatement economics hinge on who pays for early-stage inputs like methane-reducing feed supplements and slurry lids; with farm margins tight, a coordinated model—blending buyer premiums, public cost-shares, and green-finance instruments—is usually needed to avoid penalizing smaller producers, and Nestlé’s departure complicates the coalition’s ability to aggregate demand and negotiate lower unit costs at scale. What changes on the farm, for financiers, and across supply chains For producers, the near-term signal is mixed: one major buyer is still funding on-farm pilots but no longer inside the alliance’s shared roadmap, which could slow knowledge transfer between regions that differ on climate, feed, and herd structure, even as individual Nestlé programs continue to trial seaweed-based additives, nitrification inhibitors, covered lagoons with biogas capture, and pasture rotations to improve enteric and manure outcomes; in parallel, veterinarians and breeders stress that fertility and animal health gains can cut emissions intensity without shrinking output, though activists argue absolute reductions are needed if national targets are to be met. Financiers and insurers will keep pressing for comparable disclosures because the cost of capital increasingly reflects climate-risk metrics: banks baking “sustainability-linked” terms into dairy loans need clear, auditable KPIs, and exporters eyeing tariff-free access to markets with carbon-border rules will face tougher paperwork if standards splinter, which is why industry groups are urging a minimum common MRV (measurement-reporting-verification) framework even when brand strategies differ. For consumers—and for downstream brands in chocolate, infant formula, and ice cream—the implications will show up more in labels and price architecture than in the taste of products: if buyers pay farmers for verified methane abatement while feed and equipment remain pricey, some costs may pass through, but over time biogas revenue, fertilizer substitution, and efficiency gains can offset outlays and stabilize retail pricing. The political risk is that today’s corporate exit becomes tomorrow’s cultural flashpoint, especially in countries where farmer protests have already shaped election cycles; to avoid backlash, climate policy designers are experimenting with “pay for performance” that rewards measured reductions rather than prescribing a single technology path. The bottom line is not that dairy decarbonization stalls, but that governance gets messier: Nestlé’s solo track keeps momentum on pilots yet raises coordination costs for everyone else, and the outcome to watch is whether competing alliances converge on interoperable data, verification, and crediting rules so that farmers can sell a ton of avoided methane once—and get recognized for it across buyers, banks, and border regimes. 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Nurul Majid Humayun’s Death and the Placement of Prisons under the International Red Cross

Swadesh Roy

Freedom fighter, politician, and former minister Nurul Majid Humayun died in prison after being denied necessary medical treatment. Even the day before his death, his hands were cuffed to the hospital bed. Human rights activist Nur Khan called this a complete violation of human rights, describing the denial of medical care as itself a grave breach of those rights.

I met Nurul Majid Humayun and heard him speak several times during my journalism career. At that time, he possibly held a significant position in the Awami Jubo League. Before him, the Jubo League had been led by Mostafa Mohsin Montu. I could never quite reconcile Humayun with Montu in that role. Yet even before I saw Humayun active in politics, I knew of him through one particular story told by Narsingdi’s freedom-fighter commander Abdus Samad bhai.

During and after the Liberation War, most people in the greater Dhaka district knew Commander Samad. Listening to accounts of his unit’s battles around Dhaka and its outskirts, I once imagined him to be a fierce man. But after becoming his colleague in a newspaper, I discovered the opposite—a gentle, humble person. During breaks at work, especially when Alauddin Ahmed bhai (of the Communist Party—Alauddin-Matin group) encouraged him, Samad bhai would recount wartime memories.

One day he said they had freed Narsingdi district as early as November 1971. At that time, several Pakistani soldiers had surrendered to them along with Razakars and Al-Badr members. Among them was one Pakistani boy under twenty—his face innocent as a child’s. Abdus Samad said, “Humayun brought him to me. I didn’t know Urdu; Humayun did. So he interpreted the broken Urdu of that young soldier. Through him I understood that before coming here, they had been told by their superiors that East Pakistan was full of ‘kafirs,’ and that India—helping those ‘kafirs’—was the enemy. They were sent here on a jihad against the ‘kafirs’ and India. But on arriving, he saw that most people were Muslims, often more devout than in his own country. India, too, was helping devout Muslims, not ‘kafirs.’ He said he had been here for seven months and had not killed anyone. Now he wished only to return to his mother.”

হাসপাতালের বিছানায় নুরুল মজিদের হাতকড়া নিয়ে বিতর্ক, যা বলছেন মানবাধিকারকর্মীরা | প্রথম আলো

Samad bhai continued, “After hearing this through Humayun’s interpretation and seeing that bright youthful face, I, too, felt pity. I looked at Humayun and asked, ‘What can I do? You tell me, Humayun.’ He said, ‘Commander, I can’t say… but—’ and lowered his head. So I replied, ‘All right, I’ll do as you wish. Don’t put him before a firing squad; keep him in jail.’ Later that boy returned home via India with the 97,000 who surrendered.”

Years later, seeing Nurul Majid Humayun’s conduct on the political field and recalling his calm and decent manner—even when he ran as an independent in the 1986 election against powerful Awami League-led alliance and BNP candidates—I was reminded of Commander Samad’s story. It was clear that Humayun truly belonged to a family steeped in humane and noble traditions.

Yet, with the changing winds of politics, we now must confront the reality of his inhumane death in prison. Perhaps he himself did not suffer as much from that death as his family and well-wishers did. For a freedom fighter, such an end may seem a tragic extension of his lifelong struggle. Had he lived to witness such indignity inflicted on others, he might have felt even deeper sorrow for the dishonor brought upon the nation he helped to create.

International Human Rights Commission IHRC Corporation - "Explore the International Human Rights Commission IHRC Alliance

Still, what Nurul Majid Humayun may have personally felt before his death—or what he might have felt had he survived—is not the main issue. The pressing question is what the current government should now consider regarding the many political leaders, workers, and freedom fighters imprisoned today, and the broader security and governance of the prison system itself.

Regardless of how much control those running the government have over the state’s machinery, it is those in this government who will bear responsibility in the future for any mishaps of this era. And Mahfuz Alam—the very person who, as was introduced to the international community, meticulously designed the rise of this government under the leadership of Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus—has now publicly stated that political parties have divided various government posts among themselves and installed their own people. He says that as an adviser, he is anxious about when he might have to leave, and that the orders of the executives in this government are not being adequately implemented.

This statement is not just an administrative concern—it reflects a deeper instability that now defines the state. When the government itself begins to lose cohesion between its political leadership and the bureaucracy it depends upon, then both governance and accountability collapse into confusion. At such times, the state apparatus functions through fear rather than order, and within that climate, no one—neither citizen nor prisoner—can feel truly secure.

After Mahfuz Alam’s statement and the death of Nurul Majid Humayun, it is therefore natural that a sense of fear would arise concerning the prisons. Bangladesh’s politics indeed carries an exceptionally high degree of mutual vendetta compared with other countries. The pattern has repeated itself decade after decade—each government, when in power, wielding authority as retribution rather than reform. During the current government’s tenure, no effective steps have been taken in the last 55 years to reduce this vendetta; instead, in many instances, it has been further stoked.

জাতীয় চার নেতাকে হত্যার কারণ কী ছিল

Thus, when the administration is not heeding the government, there is naturally little assurance that this vendetta will not reach the prisons. And there are precedents of this in our country. Even in what should be the safest place in the world—a prison—there have been brutal murders. These incidents are not isolated—they are symptoms of a national failure to separate justice from vengeance. The public institutions that should embody neutrality and protection have instead become extensions of political punishment.

What was the reason behind the killing of the four national leaders?

And even now, it is not clear who actually carried out that killing. In 1991, on the occasion of Jail Killing Day on November 3, Ataus Samad bhai assigned me to prepare a report. While working on it, I called Colonel Faruq (ret.) and asked him various questions about how and by whom the jail killing had been executed. At one point, he said, “I have the same questions as you about how the November 3 jail killing took place—who did it—because my own paternal aunt’s husband (fupa) also died in that incident.”

Whether Colonel Faruq was speaking the absolute truth is not for me to say. But the ambiguity surrounding that crime remains as unresolved today as it was then. Alongside that, there is another incident I learned while working as a journalist: in early October 1975, when Tajuddin Ahmad met his wife, Zohra Tajuddin, he sent a message through her to Moyezüddin Ahmad, President of the Bangladesh Red Cross Society, instructing that he should request the International Red Cross to bring Bangladesh’s prisons under its authority immediately. And when Zohra Tajuddin went to see him again in the last week of October, Tajuddin Ahmad told her, “Tell Moyezüddin to do something within a week—that is, to bring the prisons under the International Red Cross—otherwise they will very soon kill us in the jail.”

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) | World Economic Forum

I later confirmed this account with Moyezuddin Ahmad himself; he said he could not act on it because he had not received the government’s cooperation. The tragedy that followed a few days later stands as a permanent reminder of how neglect and arrogance can become accomplices to history’s cruellest acts.

From the outset, the present government has attached importance to international institutions, including the United Nations. It had the International Human Rights Commission investigate all killings up to August 15. The government has also made every effort to involve the United Nations in the Rohingya issue. These steps show an acknowledgment that international cooperation strengthens legitimacy; yet, at the same time, the same cooperation must extend to protecting human rights inside the country’s own borders.

Therefore, after the death of Nurul Majid Humayun and in light of Mahfuz Alam’s statement, the current government must accept reality and undertake practical, coordinated thinking—together with the United Nations and other international human rights bodies—about the safety and treatment of prisoners. In that context, bringing the prisons under the authority of the International Red Cross could be considered. The measure may appear symbolic, but it would demonstrate a moral and political willingness to rise above vengeance, to place humanity above power.

And that, it seems to me, would be the right path for the government to avoid any kind of accident or untoward incident in the prisons in the future.

 

Author: Journalist and editor honored with the nation’s highest state award; Editor, Sarakhon, The Present World.

05:35:03 pm, Wednesday, 8 October 2025

Why the world’s biggest food company is stepping back Nestlé has withdrawn from a high-profile international alliance to cut methane from dairy supply chains, a move that instantly sharpened debate over how fast and by what methods the sector should decarbonize; the company says it will keep pursuing on-farm emissions cuts through its own programs while reassessing the group’s approach and governance, but the exit deprives the coalition of its most recognizable member and risks slowing peer benchmarking, shared pilot data, and pooled purchasing that can bring down costs for farmers. Methane from cattle is a potent, short-lived climate pollutant, and many governments have leaned on voluntary industry compacts to accelerate adoption of feed additives, manure management, and breeding strategies; critics of Nestlé’s decision warn that a fragmentation of efforts could reduce transparency and make it harder for buyers, lenders, and regulators to compare progress across brands, whereas supporters counter that company-led projects tied to local agronomy and subsidies often deliver faster, measurable gains than broad global charters. The policy backdrop is shifting as well: several markets are moving from pure carrots to a mix of incentives and performance-based conditions on grants and export supports, and that pivot raises stakes for how milk processors document emissions baselines and third-party verification, because the credibility of Scope 3 targets rests on comparable methodologies rather than marketing claims alone. Practically, much of the abatement economics hinge on who pays for early-stage inputs like methane-reducing feed supplements and slurry lids; with farm margins tight, a coordinated model—blending buyer premiums, public cost-shares, and green-finance instruments—is usually needed to avoid penalizing smaller producers, and Nestlé’s departure complicates the coalition’s ability to aggregate demand and negotiate lower unit costs at scale. What changes on the farm, for financiers, and across supply chains For producers, the near-term signal is mixed: one major buyer is still funding on-farm pilots but no longer inside the alliance’s shared roadmap, which could slow knowledge transfer between regions that differ on climate, feed, and herd structure, even as individual Nestlé programs continue to trial seaweed-based additives, nitrification inhibitors, covered lagoons with biogas capture, and pasture rotations to improve enteric and manure outcomes; in parallel, veterinarians and breeders stress that fertility and animal health gains can cut emissions intensity without shrinking output, though activists argue absolute reductions are needed if national targets are to be met. Financiers and insurers will keep pressing for comparable disclosures because the cost of capital increasingly reflects climate-risk metrics: banks baking “sustainability-linked” terms into dairy loans need clear, auditable KPIs, and exporters eyeing tariff-free access to markets with carbon-border rules will face tougher paperwork if standards splinter, which is why industry groups are urging a minimum common MRV (measurement-reporting-verification) framework even when brand strategies differ. For consumers—and for downstream brands in chocolate, infant formula, and ice cream—the implications will show up more in labels and price architecture than in the taste of products: if buyers pay farmers for verified methane abatement while feed and equipment remain pricey, some costs may pass through, but over time biogas revenue, fertilizer substitution, and efficiency gains can offset outlays and stabilize retail pricing. The political risk is that today’s corporate exit becomes tomorrow’s cultural flashpoint, especially in countries where farmer protests have already shaped election cycles; to avoid backlash, climate policy designers are experimenting with “pay for performance” that rewards measured reductions rather than prescribing a single technology path. The bottom line is not that dairy decarbonization stalls, but that governance gets messier: Nestlé’s solo track keeps momentum on pilots yet raises coordination costs for everyone else, and the outcome to watch is whether competing alliances converge on interoperable data, verification, and crediting rules so that farmers can sell a ton of avoided methane once—and get recognized for it across buyers, banks, and border regimes.

Nurul Majid Humayun’s Death and the Placement of Prisons under the International Red Cross

05:35:03 pm, Wednesday, 8 October 2025

Freedom fighter, politician, and former minister Nurul Majid Humayun died in prison after being denied necessary medical treatment. Even the day before his death, his hands were cuffed to the hospital bed. Human rights activist Nur Khan called this a complete violation of human rights, describing the denial of medical care as itself a grave breach of those rights.

I met Nurul Majid Humayun and heard him speak several times during my journalism career. At that time, he possibly held a significant position in the Awami Jubo League. Before him, the Jubo League had been led by Mostafa Mohsin Montu. I could never quite reconcile Humayun with Montu in that role. Yet even before I saw Humayun active in politics, I knew of him through one particular story told by Narsingdi’s freedom-fighter commander Abdus Samad bhai.

During and after the Liberation War, most people in the greater Dhaka district knew Commander Samad. Listening to accounts of his unit’s battles around Dhaka and its outskirts, I once imagined him to be a fierce man. But after becoming his colleague in a newspaper, I discovered the opposite—a gentle, humble person. During breaks at work, especially when Alauddin Ahmed bhai (of the Communist Party—Alauddin-Matin group) encouraged him, Samad bhai would recount wartime memories.

One day he said they had freed Narsingdi district as early as November 1971. At that time, several Pakistani soldiers had surrendered to them along with Razakars and Al-Badr members. Among them was one Pakistani boy under twenty—his face innocent as a child’s. Abdus Samad said, “Humayun brought him to me. I didn’t know Urdu; Humayun did. So he interpreted the broken Urdu of that young soldier. Through him I understood that before coming here, they had been told by their superiors that East Pakistan was full of ‘kafirs,’ and that India—helping those ‘kafirs’—was the enemy. They were sent here on a jihad against the ‘kafirs’ and India. But on arriving, he saw that most people were Muslims, often more devout than in his own country. India, too, was helping devout Muslims, not ‘kafirs.’ He said he had been here for seven months and had not killed anyone. Now he wished only to return to his mother.”

হাসপাতালের বিছানায় নুরুল মজিদের হাতকড়া নিয়ে বিতর্ক, যা বলছেন মানবাধিকারকর্মীরা | প্রথম আলো

Samad bhai continued, “After hearing this through Humayun’s interpretation and seeing that bright youthful face, I, too, felt pity. I looked at Humayun and asked, ‘What can I do? You tell me, Humayun.’ He said, ‘Commander, I can’t say… but—’ and lowered his head. So I replied, ‘All right, I’ll do as you wish. Don’t put him before a firing squad; keep him in jail.’ Later that boy returned home via India with the 97,000 who surrendered.”

Years later, seeing Nurul Majid Humayun’s conduct on the political field and recalling his calm and decent manner—even when he ran as an independent in the 1986 election against powerful Awami League-led alliance and BNP candidates—I was reminded of Commander Samad’s story. It was clear that Humayun truly belonged to a family steeped in humane and noble traditions.

Yet, with the changing winds of politics, we now must confront the reality of his inhumane death in prison. Perhaps he himself did not suffer as much from that death as his family and well-wishers did. For a freedom fighter, such an end may seem a tragic extension of his lifelong struggle. Had he lived to witness such indignity inflicted on others, he might have felt even deeper sorrow for the dishonor brought upon the nation he helped to create.

International Human Rights Commission IHRC Corporation - "Explore the International Human Rights Commission IHRC Alliance

Still, what Nurul Majid Humayun may have personally felt before his death—or what he might have felt had he survived—is not the main issue. The pressing question is what the current government should now consider regarding the many political leaders, workers, and freedom fighters imprisoned today, and the broader security and governance of the prison system itself.

Regardless of how much control those running the government have over the state’s machinery, it is those in this government who will bear responsibility in the future for any mishaps of this era. And Mahfuz Alam—the very person who, as was introduced to the international community, meticulously designed the rise of this government under the leadership of Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus—has now publicly stated that political parties have divided various government posts among themselves and installed their own people. He says that as an adviser, he is anxious about when he might have to leave, and that the orders of the executives in this government are not being adequately implemented.

This statement is not just an administrative concern—it reflects a deeper instability that now defines the state. When the government itself begins to lose cohesion between its political leadership and the bureaucracy it depends upon, then both governance and accountability collapse into confusion. At such times, the state apparatus functions through fear rather than order, and within that climate, no one—neither citizen nor prisoner—can feel truly secure.

After Mahfuz Alam’s statement and the death of Nurul Majid Humayun, it is therefore natural that a sense of fear would arise concerning the prisons. Bangladesh’s politics indeed carries an exceptionally high degree of mutual vendetta compared with other countries. The pattern has repeated itself decade after decade—each government, when in power, wielding authority as retribution rather than reform. During the current government’s tenure, no effective steps have been taken in the last 55 years to reduce this vendetta; instead, in many instances, it has been further stoked.

জাতীয় চার নেতাকে হত্যার কারণ কী ছিল

Thus, when the administration is not heeding the government, there is naturally little assurance that this vendetta will not reach the prisons. And there are precedents of this in our country. Even in what should be the safest place in the world—a prison—there have been brutal murders. These incidents are not isolated—they are symptoms of a national failure to separate justice from vengeance. The public institutions that should embody neutrality and protection have instead become extensions of political punishment.

What was the reason behind the killing of the four national leaders?

And even now, it is not clear who actually carried out that killing. In 1991, on the occasion of Jail Killing Day on November 3, Ataus Samad bhai assigned me to prepare a report. While working on it, I called Colonel Faruq (ret.) and asked him various questions about how and by whom the jail killing had been executed. At one point, he said, “I have the same questions as you about how the November 3 jail killing took place—who did it—because my own paternal aunt’s husband (fupa) also died in that incident.”

Whether Colonel Faruq was speaking the absolute truth is not for me to say. But the ambiguity surrounding that crime remains as unresolved today as it was then. Alongside that, there is another incident I learned while working as a journalist: in early October 1975, when Tajuddin Ahmad met his wife, Zohra Tajuddin, he sent a message through her to Moyezüddin Ahmad, President of the Bangladesh Red Cross Society, instructing that he should request the International Red Cross to bring Bangladesh’s prisons under its authority immediately. And when Zohra Tajuddin went to see him again in the last week of October, Tajuddin Ahmad told her, “Tell Moyezüddin to do something within a week—that is, to bring the prisons under the International Red Cross—otherwise they will very soon kill us in the jail.”

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) | World Economic Forum

I later confirmed this account with Moyezuddin Ahmad himself; he said he could not act on it because he had not received the government’s cooperation. The tragedy that followed a few days later stands as a permanent reminder of how neglect and arrogance can become accomplices to history’s cruellest acts.

From the outset, the present government has attached importance to international institutions, including the United Nations. It had the International Human Rights Commission investigate all killings up to August 15. The government has also made every effort to involve the United Nations in the Rohingya issue. These steps show an acknowledgment that international cooperation strengthens legitimacy; yet, at the same time, the same cooperation must extend to protecting human rights inside the country’s own borders.

Therefore, after the death of Nurul Majid Humayun and in light of Mahfuz Alam’s statement, the current government must accept reality and undertake practical, coordinated thinking—together with the United Nations and other international human rights bodies—about the safety and treatment of prisoners. In that context, bringing the prisons under the authority of the International Red Cross could be considered. The measure may appear symbolic, but it would demonstrate a moral and political willingness to rise above vengeance, to place humanity above power.

And that, it seems to me, would be the right path for the government to avoid any kind of accident or untoward incident in the prisons in the future.

 

Author: Journalist and editor honored with the nation’s highest state award; Editor, Sarakhon, The Present World.